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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STEPHEN WHITEHEAD and 
DEBORAH WHITEHEAD, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellee, 
vs. 
AMERICAN MOTORS SALES 
CORPORATION and JEEP 
CORPORATION. LARRY ANDERSON, 
VARIABLE ANNUITY LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
Case No. 19,695 
PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF ON REHEARING 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
Appellee (petitioner on rehearing) Stephen Whitehead will 
be referred to herein as "plaintiff" or as "Whitehead." The 
claims of Deborah Whitehead were settled at trial, and she was 
not a party to the appeal. Appellants (respondents on rehear-
ing) American Motors Sales Corporation and Jeep Corporation will 
be referred to compositely as "AMC/Jeep" or "defendants." 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
REHEARING CONTEMPLATES A PLENARY REVIEW OF 
ALL ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL. 
Plaintiff filed his Petition for Rehearing on February 28, 
1989. AMC/Jeep had a full opportunity to present all its 
arguments against the granting of the petition. AMC/Jeep sought 
and obtained all the extensions of time (two were granted) which 
it felt necessary, and also sought and obtained leave to file an 
oversize answer to the petition. AMC/Jeep served its Answer to 
Petition for Rehearing on April 4, 1989. On July 12, 1989, this 
Court entered an order granting plaintiff's Petition for 
Rehearing. 
AMC/Jeep nevertheless devotes a substantial portion of its 
Brief on Rehearing to challenge the propriety of this Court's 
order granting rehearing, and further asserts that plaintiff's 
claims are not within the scope of rehearing. The arguments 
which AMC/Jeep now raises are the same as in its Answer to 
Petition for Rehearing. AMC/Jeep's primary response to plain-
tiff's substantive claims is to quote from and refer to the 
majority opinion in this case. 
The grant of rehearing had the effect of withdrawing this 
Court's initial opinion, and the matter should now be considered 
by the Court has though no opinion had been rendered. Karren v. 
Bair, 63 Utah 344, 353, 225 P. 1094,,1097 (1924); 5 Am. Jur. 2d 
Appeal and Error § 984 (1962). 
2 
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This Court's decision to grant rehearing is the law of the 
case. Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 
P.2d 42, 44-45 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). It is improper for 
AMC/Jeep to seek reconsideration of that decision, and it would 
likewise be improper for this Court to do so. Id. An analogous 
situation was presented to the court in Drury v. Lunceford, 18 
Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662 (1966). In accordance with the rules, 
one party had sought a rehearing (a new trial), and the trial 
court granted the motion. The other party then sought re-
consideration of the grant of a new trial. This Court held that 
reconsideration was not permitted under the rules, and explained 
that the restriction applied both to litigants and to the court: 
This reflection brings one to realize what 
an unsatisfactory situation would exist if a 
judge could carry in his mind indefinitely a 
state of uncertainty as to what the final 
resolution of the matter should be. 
When the precedure [sic] 
authorizing a motion for a new trial has 
been followed and, pursuant to proper 
notice, the parties have made their repre-
sentations to the court, and the court has 
duly considered and made his decision upon 
that motion, that completes both the duty 
and the prerogative of the court. In order 
to avoid such a state of indecision for both 
the judge and the parties, practical 
expediency demands that there be some 
finality to the actions of the court; and he 
should not be in the position of having the 
further duty of acting as a court of review 
upon his own ruling. 
Drury, 415 P.2d at 663-64 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
This Court should reject AMC/Jeep's belated and improper 
request to reconsider the grant of rehearing. 
3 
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AMC/Jeep also condemns many of plaintiff's claims as being 
either too similar or too dissimilar to the claims discussed in 
the initial briefs. Rehearing is not so limited. 
Plaintiff acknowledges that numerous decisions state that a 
rehearing is not for the purpose of rehashing the same argu-
ments, nor is it proper to raise new issues on rehearing. The 
purpose of rehearing, nevertheless, is to insure that a correct 
decision is made. Rehearing is a last opportunity to correct 
error, and is not discouraged. Phelps Dodge Corp., Morenci 
Branch v. Industrial Com'n, 90 Ariz. 379, 368 P.2d 450, 452 
(1962). Although the stated rules are properly invoked in ap-
propriate circumstances, the decisions also confirm that the 
courts will consider the arguments necessary to insure that 
justice is achieved. E.g., Kentner v. Gulf Insurance Co., 298 
Or. 69, 689 P.2d 955, 958 (1984); Shafer v. State Highway Com'n, 
169 Kan. 264, 219 P.2d 448, 449 (1950). This is particularly 
true where issues have become material as a result of the 
initial opinion, or where the initial opinion has clarified the 
specific issues the Court deems critical. See Wilhorn Builders, 
Inc. v. Cortaro Management Co., 82 Ariz. 48, 308 P.2d 251, 252 
(1957) . 
An example is Albrecht v. Uranium Services, 596 P.2d 1025 
(Utah 1979), rev'd on rehearing, 607 P.2d 836 (Utah 1980). The 
case involved a review of the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment. This Court initially upheld the trial court, holding 
that there were no disputed issues of material fact. A dissent-
4 
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ing opinion by Justice Stewart argued that the affidavits 
presented a material factual dispute. 596 P.2d at 1027. The 
defendant petitioned for a rehearing, rearguing the "same point 
on rehearing as it asserted on appeal; to wit: that genuine 
issues of material facts have been raised . . . ." 607 P.2d at 
836. The second time around, this Court was persuaded by the 
defendant, reversed its prior opinion, and adopted the prior 
dissenting opinion as the opinion of the Court. Id. 
Plaintiff demonstrates below in connection with specific 
claims that his arguments are clearly within the proper scope of 
rehearing and justice dictates that the Court fully rehear this 
matter. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PREVENTED EXTENSIVE CROSS-
EXAMINATION INTO COMPARISONS WITH OTHER VEHICLES 
BECAUSE IT WAS NOT A KEY ISSUE AND WOULD HAVE 
MADE THE CASE UNMANAGEABLE AND CONFUSING. 
AMC/Jeep asserts that the trial court abused its discretion 
in limiting AMC/Jeep's cross-examination of plaintiff's experts 
concerning their knowledge of the rollover propensities of other 
vehicles. (Brief of Appellants on Rehearing, Point I.) There 
was no abuse of discretion, however, because the rollover 
propensities of other vehicles was not a key element of plain-
tiffs case, and even if it was, any limitation of cross-
examination was not prejudicial. 
AMC/Jeep's attempt to show that comparisons with other 
vehicles is a key aspect of plaintiff's proof is logically 
5 
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flawed. AMC/Jeep argues that plaintiff was required to prove 
that the Commando was defective, and because comparisons with 
other vehicles could inferentially be construed as evidence of a 
product defect, it follows that comparisons with other vehicles 
was a critical aspect of plaintiff's proof. The initial 
proposition is correct, but the corollary is not. Although it 
is true that proof of a defect was a critical aspect of plain-
tiff's proof, it does not follow that every component or subset 
of "proof of a defect" was itself a critical aspect of plain-
tiff's proof. Even if it is assumed that plaintiff made 
comparisons with other vehicles (as opposed to defendants 
interjecting that issue), such comparisons were not a critical 
or key aspect of plaintiff's proof. 
The critical and primary emphasis of plaintiff's proof on 
the issue of product defect was that the Jeep Commando was not 
able to safely perform reasonably foreseeable evasive maneuvers 
at highway speeds. (E.g., R. 2441-43.) AMC/Jeep does not 
dispute this. Plaintiff used data generated from testing of 
Jeep CJ-5s and CJ-7s to predict the rollover propensity of the 
Commando, which has the same narrow track width and high center 
of gravity, and therefore the same critical handling character-
istics. (E.g., R. 2448, 2455.) A CJ-5 film was introduced by 
plaintiff to illustrate the data. 
The trial court did not limit on the ground of relevance 
AMC/Jeep's ability to respond by showing that other vehicles 
with the same track width and center of gravity as the CJ-5 were 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
stable. That was not the thrust of AMC/Jeep's opposition. The 
primary aim of the excluded evidence and cross-examination was 
to show that the Commando was not the only unstable vehicle on 
the road. Such evidence was irrelevant, and would have expanded 
the length and complexity of the case beyond manageable propor-
tions. 
AMC/Jeep does not dispute that in determining whether the 
trial court abused its discretion in identifying the key issues, 
this Court should apply a multi-level analysis. The Court 
should first determine what the trial court identified as the 
key elements of plaintiff's proof, and then determine if there 
is support in the record for the trial court's identification. 
Second, and only if the cross-examination concerns a key issue, 
this Court should then consider whether any limitation of cross-
examination prevented the defendants from adequately challenging 
plaintiff's evidence. (Petitioner's Brief on Rehearing at 9.) 
AMC/Jeep does not refer to any evidence which would show 
that the trial judge abused his discretion in determining that 
comparisons with other vehicles was not a primary aspect of 
plaintiff's proof on the critical issue of product defect. 
There is evidence in the record which supports the trial court's 
determination, and it must therefore be affirmed. 
7 
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POINT III 
THE FILMS OFFERED BY DEFENDANTS ARE NOT 
PART OF THE RECORD IN THIS CASE 
AND CANNOT BE REVIEWED BY THIS COURT. 
One of AMC/Jeep's primary contentions on appeal was that 
the trial court erred in excluding certain exhibits offered by 
AMC/Jeep, including two films and a story board. Plaintiff 
demonstrated in his Brief on Rehearing that the majority opinion 
erred in addressing the admissibility of those exhibits, because 
the exhibits were not before the Court for consideration or 
review. AMC/Jeep responds by characterizing plaintiff's 
argument as "hypertechnical" and erroneous.1 (Brief of Appel-
lants on Rehearing at page 32.) 
Plaintiff's arguments are neither hypertechnical nor 
erroneous. AMC/Jeep makes a vigorous attempt to demonstrate 
that the excluded exhibits were somehow designated as part of 
the record, but wholly misses the point. Regardless of whether 
the exhibits were designated as part of the record (plaintiff's 
initial Brief on Rehearing establishes that the exhibits were 
not so designated), the inescapable fact remains that the 
exhibits were not part of the physical record transmitted to 
this Court for review. The exhibits furthermore are not in the 
possession of the trial court clerk. AMC/Jeep apparently took 
the exhibits home with them after they were excluded by the 
trial court. The exhibits were not, and could not have been, 
1AMC/Jeep's venomous criticisms of Whitehead's argument and 
of the manner in which it was presented are unprofessional and 
inaccurate. See Point VII below in this Reply Brief. 
8 
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part of the record on appeal in this case, because AMC/Jeep 
retained the exhibits and did not take the proper steps to 
proffer them for purposes of appellate review. 
AMC/Jeep had the burden to preserve a record that would 
enable appellate review of its claims of error. State v. 
Theison, 709 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985). In the case of excluded 
exhibits, the proper procedure is to proffer the exhibits so 
that they may be retained in the record although not admitted 
into evidence. AMC/Jeep did not fulfill its duty to preserve 
the evidence in the record. Plaintiff raised this issue in its 
initial brief.2 
Where there is nothing before this Court to demonstrate 
otherwise, this Court should presume that there is something in 
the evidence to justify the trial court's decision. Mascaro v. 
Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 943 (Utah 1987); James Manufacturing Co. v. 
Wilson, 15 Utah 2d 210, 390 P.2d 127, 129 (1964). This argument 
is not hypertechnical. Many years have passed since the trial 
2AMC/Jeep claims that this issue was raised for the first 
time on rehearing. That is not correct. Plaintiff's initial 
Brief on Appeal argued, with supporting citations, that the 
films had not been admitted in evidence and that their per-
suasive effect could not be demonstrated or argued. (Brief of 
Respondents Deborah Whitehead and Stephen Whitehead, dated 
August 2, 1984, at p. 45.) 
AMC/Jeep apparently now asserts that there is a distinction 
between arguing that the admissibility of an exhibit cannot be 
reviewed because the exhibit was not admitted into evidence, and 
arguing that the admissibility of the exhibit cannot be reviewed 
because it was not part of the record (which in turn was because 
it was not admitted into evidence). If there is a distinction, 
it makes no substantive difference. 
9 
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\ 
of this case, and counsel for plaintiff cannot now remember all 
the reasons why the exhibits were inadmissible. Some of the 
reasons are apparent from the record, but counsel believes that 
there were other reasons, inherent in the exhibits, which were 
not articulated by the trial court but which would be an 
independent basis for excluding the exhibits. The decision of 
the trial court should be affirmed if there is any proper basis 
for doing so, even if that basis was not articulated by the 
trial court. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assoc., 752 P.2d 892, 895 
(Utah 1988). 
Plaintiffs counsel wanted to examine the exhibits in 
connection with this rehearing to refresh his recollection as to 
all the reasons why the exhibits were excluded. Despite 
diligent effort, counsel could not locate the exhibits. The 
exhibits are not physically part of the record. It likewise was 
physically impossible for this Court to have examined the 
exhibits. 
AMC/Jeep failed to preserve the excluded evidence in the 
record. Plaintiff properly raised the failure in its initial 
brief. AMC/Jeep's failure precludes appellate review. 
POINT IV 
AMC/JEEP'S FAILURE TO MAKE A GOOD FAITH RESPONSE 
TO DISCOVERY REQUESTS JUSTIFIED THE TRIAL COURT'S 
EXCLUSION OF AMC/JEEP'S EXHIBITS. 
AMC/Jeep c l a i m s e r r o r i n t h e e x c l u s i o n o f a Heitzman f i l m 
o f J e e p C J - 5 s , a Heitzman f i l m on r o l l o v e r s o f n o n - J e e p v e h i c -
l e s , and a "s toryboard" ( E x h i b i t 1 3 0 ) . One o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t s 
10 
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reasons for excluding these exhibits was AMC/Jeepfs failure to 
produce them in response to discovery requests.3 The discovery 
requests included (1) an initial group which sought disclosure 
of tests relating to the handling characteristics of the 
Commando, (2) plaintiff's fourth set of interrogatories, which 
sought disclosure of materials provided to AMC/Jeep's expert 
witnesses, and (3) a set, submitted by defendant Larry Anderson, 
which sought identification of all exhibits. (Petitioner's Brief 
on Rehearing at 24-25.) 
AMC/Jeep's response to plaintiff's discovery abuse argu-
ments is that the arguments regarding the first group of 
requests are precluded from review because they are too similar 
to arguments raised previously, and the arguments regarding 
plaintiff's fourth set of interrogatories are precluded because 
they are too dissimilar to arguments raised previously. 
AMC/Jeep also claims that it was not required to disclose all of 
the requested information about its experts. AMC/Jeep does not 
defend its failure to answer the Larry Anderson interrogatories. 
Point I of this Reply Brief establishes that the claims of 
discovery abuse are well within the proper scope of a rehearing. 
One of AMC/Jeep's criticisms of plaintiffs' argument is that it 
called the Court's attention to AMC/Jeep's failures to answer 
plaintiffs' fourth set of interrogatories (seeking information 
3The Heitzman film on non-Jeep rollovers and the storyboard 
were also inadmissible because they were irrelevant (Petition-
er's Brief on Rehearing at 37-40). Appellate review of all the 
exhibits is precluded by AMC/Jeep's failure to make them part of 
the record. (Point III above.) 
11 
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regarding material reviewed by AMC/Jeep's experts) and defendant 
Larry Anderson's interrogatories to AMC/Jeep (which requested 
the names of AMC/Jeepfs experts and a list of all exhibits which 
would be offered). While AMC/Jeep's failure to answer these 
specific interrogatories was not discussed in plaintiffs' 
initial brief in this case, AMC/Jeep's failure to respond to 
discovery was extensively discussed. 
AMC/Jeep acknowledged at trial that disclosure of 
AMC/Jeep's exhibits had been requested. In discussing the 
Heitzman films, Mr. Mandlebaum, AMC/Jeep's attorney, stated that 
"[i]t wasn't requested until interrogatories, your Honor." (R. 
3343.) Notwithstanding AMC/Jeep's acknowledgment that dis-
closure of the exhibit had been requested in interrogatories, 
AMC/Jeep then proceeded to try to justify its failure to 
disclose the films by arguing that the films were immune from 
discovery either because they were work product, or because they 
had been created by Jeep's attorneys rather than by Jeep itself. 
These claims were wholly unfounded and improper. (Petitioner's 
Brief on Rehearing at 37.) 
AMC/Jeep had been very crafty and stingy in its disclosure 
of requested information to plaintiffs. The information which 
was disclosed came only after the Court's assistance was 
acquired. The exhibits in question were at least arguably 
within the scope of plaintiffs' initial interrogatories to 
AMC/Jeep. Plaintiff had sought discovery of tests relating to 
the handling characteristics of the Commando, and AMC/Jeep 
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
attempted to introduce the exhibits to demonstrate those very 
handling characteristics. Even though AMC/Jeep has disputed the 
scope of the initial interrogatories, plaintiffs' fourth set of 
interrogatories and defendant Larry Anderson's interrogatories 
to AMC/Jeep unquestionably sought disclosure of the films. The 
decision of the trial court to exclude the films was based not 
just on the rulings of the prior trial judge, but on the entire 
history of AMC/Jeep's recalcitrance in discovery. Plaintiff 
properly, on rehearing, called this Court's attention to all 
aspects of that discovery, even though some of the individual 
interrogatories were not discussed in the initial briefs. 
AMC/Jeep does not dispute, and thereby implicitly admits, 
that the excluded exhibits were within the scope of plaintiffs' 
fourth set of interrogatories and defendant Larry Anderson's 
interrogatories. AMC/Jeep's only response is apparently that 
the exhibits were not a proper subject of discovery because they 
would come in through an expert witness. The expert discovery 
rules in effect at that time allowed only limited discovery 
concerning expert witnesses. 
AMC/Jeep's argument illustrates the approach it took to all 
of plaintiff's discovery requests. AMC/Jeep ignored the mandate 
that the rules (and also the interrogatories) are to be con-
strued by both court and counsel "to secure the just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination of every action." Utah R. Civ. P. 
1. "[U]ndue rigidities or technicalities" are to be eliminated. 
Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189, 429 P.2d 39, 40 (1967). 
13 
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Former Rule 26(b)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
did limit the circumstances under which a party could discover 
the facts known or opinions held by an expert witness. The Rule 
did not shield from disclosure, however, materials which had 
been provided to the expert, nor exhibits which would be 
admitted at trial. The subject exhibits were not protected 
under former Rule 26(b)(4), and AMC/Jeep clearly should have 
disclosed the films in response to the various interrogatories 
discussed above. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE 
ON COMPARISONS WITH OTHER VEHICLES AND 
ON SEAT BELTS. 
In Point IV of its brief, AMC/Jeep argues in support of the 
majority opinion's accumulation of nonprejudicial errors. 
Plaintiff has adequately addressed that issue in his initial 
brief on rehearing, and will not reargue that issue here. In 
the course of presenting its arguments, however, AMC/Jeep makes 
several assertions that are incorrect and which demand a 
response• 
First, on page 45 of its brief, AMC/Jeep states that the 
trial court permitted the plaintiffs to present: 
a theory of liability that the accident 
vehicle (a Jeep Commando) was defective and 
unreasonably dangerous because: 
(a) it was purportedly "sub-
stantially similar" to the CJ5; 
and 
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(b) the CJ5 was purportedly 
defective because certain tests 
purportedly showed that the CJ5 
was more likely to rollover than 
other vehicles, including 
passenger cars[.] 
Brief of Appellants on Rehearing at pages 45-46. 
AMC/Jeep has employed the tactic of mischaracterizing 
plaintiffs' argument, and then arguing against the mischarac-
terized version. AMC/Jeep made the same type of argument to the 
trial court. The trial court, whose right it is to make such 
determinations, properly held that AMC/Jeep's characterization 
of plaintifffs theory of liability was not the correct one. See 
Point II of this Reply Brief. 
The issue on appeal is thus not whether the trial judge 
allowed plaintiff to make comparisons with other vehicles, and 
then unfairly prohibited defendants from doing so, but rather 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in identifying and 
characterizing plaintiff's theory of liability. In making that 
determination, this Court should follow the standard rule and 
affirm the trial court's decision if there is a reasonable basis 
in the record to support it. 
Such a reasonable basis exists in this case. With the 
exception of the use of the CJ-5 film to demonstrate the 
handling characteristics of a vehicle with the same track width 
and center of gravity as the Jeep Commando, there were only 
three or four isolated references to other vehicles made during 
the course of plaintiffs' evidence. Those "comparisons" with 
other vehicles were either elicited by the defense or elicited 
15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
by the plaintiff in response to the defendants1 challenges. 
(Petitioner's Brief on Rehearing at 10-14.) 
Even if one assumes that there is evidence in the record 
which would have supported the trial court in characterizing the 
plaintiffs1 theory of liability as AMC/Jeep has characterized 
it, the existence of such evidence is legally irrelevant to the 
issue on appeal. The issue on appeal is whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in identifying plaintiffs1 theory of 
liability. There is competent evidence in the record which 
supports the trial court's decision, and it should be affirmed. 
AMC/Jeep also contends, on page 47 of its brief, that "the 
Court properly held that evidence of how the presence of seat 
belts affected the design safety of the vehicle was erroneously 
excluded under the circumstances of this case." [Emphasis by 
AMC/Jeep.] Plaintiff respectfully submits that this was not the 
holding of this Court. The majority opinion states, in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
We agree that evidence of how the 
presence of seat belts affected the design 
safety of the vehicle should be admitted. 
However, the bulk of defendants' proffered 
evidence and the main thrust of their 
argument regarding seat belts was directed 
at plaintiffs failure to use them as 
constituting contributory negligence or 
failure to mitigate damages. . . . We 
therefore find that the trial court did not 
err in excluding evidence that the failure 
to use seat belts constituted contributory 
negligence or failure to mitigate damages. 
101 Utah Adv. Rep. at 32. 
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This Court did not hold that the trial court erroneously 
excluded any evidence concerning seat belts. The holding was 
that if defendants had offered evidence of how the presence of a 
seat belt affected the design safety, such evidence would have 
been admissible. This Court properly held, however, that 
defendants did not present any such evidence. Even if 
defendants had presented such evidence, the additional question 
would be presented of whether the trial court had abused its 
discretion in excluding the evidence, and whether the exclusion 
was harmful. Neither of those questions was addressed by the 
Court, and it is, therefore, inaccurate to state that this Court 
held that any seat belt evidence was "erroneously" excluded. 
In addition, this Court's holding on the admissibility of 
seat belt evidence can only be construed as a holding that an 
individual has no legal duty to wear a seat belt, even if one is 
available. Accord Swaaian v. General Motors Corp., 559 A.2d 
1041 (R.I. 1989). Many and perhaps most people do not wear seat 
belts, and the failure to wear seat belts is certainly foresee-
able. In the light of that factual background, it defies logic 
to hold that the mere availability of a safety belt, which a 
person has no duty to use and which he foreseeably will not use, 
is admissible or persuasive evidence of a safe design. 
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POINT VI 
ANY RETRIAL SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THE 
ISSUE OF LIABILITY ONLY. 
In response to plaintiffs1 request that any retrial be 
limited to liability only, AMC/Jeep has cited several cases 
where the courts held that the issue of damages and liability 
were so intermingled in those cases so as to require the retrial 
be on all issues. AMC/Jeep does not refer to any evidence in 
the record to challenge plaintiffs1 assertion that the issues of 
liability and damages in this case are separable and were 
actually separated at trial. This Court should affirm the 
jury's findings on damages. 
As an alternative, if this Court is not inclined to rule as 
a matter of law that AMC/Jeep is not entitled to a second 
opportunity to challenge the amount of plaintiff's damages, this 
Court should clearly state that the trial court has discretion 
to make such a determination in this case. 
POINT VII 
AMC/JEEP'S UNJUSTIFIED CRITICISMS OF THE TRIAL 
COURT AND OF PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL AND OTHER 
CAPTIOUS COMMENTARY IS UNPROFESSIONAL. 
The briefs submitted by AMC/Jeep in this case are ran-
corous. Plaintiff made a motion to strike AMC/Jeep's opening 
Brief of Appellants because of its unjustified and harsh claim 
that the trial court was prejudiced. AMC/Jeep continues the 
same style of acrimony in its Brief of Appellants on Rehearing. 
AMC/Jeep!s brief speaks for itself in this regard. Further, 
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AMC/Jeep is captious in its presentation of facts and arguments. 
A few examples will be sufficient. 
AMC/Jeep!s 17-page statement of facts is primarily argu-
ment, and does not state the facts in the light most favorable 
to the jury verdict as is required on appeal. Scharf v. BMG 
Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985). On page 17 of its brief, for 
example, AMC/Jeep complains about a film which showed anthropo-
morphic "dummies.11 AMC/Jeep does not explain that the portions 
of the film emphasizing the dummies was not shown to the jury, 
and the jury was instructed that the film did not represent the 
movement of the occupant in the Whitehead accident. (R. 2983.) 
In footnote 5 on page 33 of its Brief, AMC/Jeep implies 
that plaintiff quoted an argument from its initial brief out of 
context. The accusation is incorrect. (See footnote 2 of this 
Reply Brief.) 
In footnote 4 on page 33 of its Brief, AMC/Jeep claims that 
plaintiff improperly omitted a period from a quotation. Even if 
the omission were in error, it would not warrant criticism. The 
omission was, however, in accordance with generally accepted 
rules of style. Columbia Law Review, et al., A Uniform System 
of Citation para. 5.3 at p. 27 (14th ed. 1986); University of 
Chicago, The Chicago Manual of Style para. 10.47 at p. 295 (13th 
ed. 1982). 
AMC/Jeep, in contrast, has added bold-facing to nearly 
every quotation in its brief without indicating that the 
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emphasis is added. A Uniform System of Citation, supra, at para 
5.2. 
It is not plaintiff's intent to debate whether strident 
arguments are appropriate. AMC/Jeep has, by any standard, 
stepped over the line of permissible argument. AMC/Jeep's 
unjustified attacks on the trial court and on plaintiff's 
counsel are not appropriate, and should not be rewarded by this 
Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Each of plaintiff's arguments are within the proper scope 
of rehear Iffg. A review of the entire record demonstrates that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion> and all parties 
received a fair trial. The judgment and verdict of the trial 
court should be affirmed. 
DATED this 2-°i> day of November, 1989. 
^^G^^f^a 4r^^V^^l^p^ 
JACKSON ftOWARD and 7} 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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